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Janine R. Wedel, Collision and Collusion: The Strange Case of Western Aid to 
 Eastern Europe.  New York: Palgrave, 2001.  322 pages.  
 
 The author is an anthropologist who teaches in the Graduate School of Public 
and International Affairs at the University of Pittsburgh.  She has previously published 
two books on Poland.  With this study she widens her horizons to consider the other 
states in the northern tier of Eastern Europe, as well--the Czech Republic, Slovakia, 
Hungary, Ukraine, and Russia.  (None of the Balkan nations are treated.) 
 In this volume she examines how the nations of the West dispensed monetary 
aid and economic advice in Eastern Europe since the collapse of the Communist Bloc.  
Her research included hundreds of interviews with leading figures in various 
bureaucracies of the Eastern European states and Western nations alike.  As well, she 
has explored in painstaking detail reports and other materials about Western aid 
initiatives and endeavors.  This all provides a solid basis for her assessments.   
 As the author notes, Western nations were eager to assist the nations of Eastern 
Europe in a quick transition from a Communist system into a privatized, free-market 
economy serving a democratic polity.  As the Communist Bloc imploded, supposed 
experts from the West found their way to the various Eastern European nations, 
offering insights and suggestions.  This “Marriott Brigade” (to use the designation 
developed for them by some Eastern European leaders) flew from one country to 
another, strewing presentations and promises generously.  In their wake came 
numerous organizations (whether from western governments or with their 
endorsement) which advised on privatization and on restructuring economies.  
Multiplied millions of dollars in aid were funnelled through these organizations and 
the Eastern European channels they decided to support.  That some of it was misused 
should come as no surprise, given the magnitude of the aid endeavors; that so much of 
it managed to enrich the few while impoverishing the many should be recognized as a 
scandal.  
 The author demonstrates that much of this aid, while well-intended, was 
dispensed with scant awareness of the peoples, societies, cultures, and histories of the 
nations of Eastern Europe.  Western advisers seem often to have come with the notion 
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that the representatives they met from the fledgling democratic states of Eastern 
Europe were naςfs unsophisticated in economics and politics; actually, as the author 
repeatedly shows, the naςveté belonged to these advisers from the West.  For example, 
under Communism, people had honed the fine art of dissimulation as a way of 
securing what they wanted from leaders without committing to substantive change.  
As the author points out, several of these Eastern European representatives quickly 
learned to use the expected terminology (“free market,” “business,” “privatization,” 
etc.) that would open the doors of the Western treasuries; subsequent use of the money 
showed a considerable difference in the meaning of the terms, however.   
 As well, the author shows that many of the Western organizations sought to 
circumvent the slow-moving structures of government in some of the Eastern 
European nations, preferring to operate more efficiently with select individuals and 
their private organizations.  However efficient this might appear, it nonetheless invited 
abuse: without local governmental control, the moneys earmarked for public service 
ended up enriching these individuals and their cronies, rather than serving the public 
good.  To complicate matters further, Western advisers encountered a significant 
difference in economic culture: much of Eastern Europe has none of the “conflict of 
interest” legislation which we in the West take for granted.  Professor Wedel offers 
numerous instances of an official from an Eastern European country offering a second 
business card to Western advisers--with the second card a private business which 
dovetailed with the official’s government ministerial responsibilities.  Another 
problem pattern identified by the author was that some of the Western advisers struck 
up exceptionally close relationships with their Eastern European counterparts--
relationships which ended up feathering the nests of both, to the detriment of the 
supposed aid projects.  (At the time of publication, several advisors from the USA 
[whom the author names and regarding whose cases she gives some detail] were under 
federal indictment for alleged misappropriation of such funds.)   
 For readers of this journal, this volume is valuable for its demonstration that 
Western foibles in reaching out to post-Communist Eastern Europe were not confined 
to proselytizing religious organizations.  In both regards, the West manifested woeful 
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ignorance of the histories, societies, and cultures of the Eastern European nations.  
Professor Wedel’s study offers much to consider and lament.  
James R. Payton, Jr. 
Redeemer University College 
 
 
